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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a tax system where personal share income in excess of the risk-free
return on equity (the equity premium) is taxed. The rate of return allowance (RRA) in
the Norwegian shareholder income tax system is, to the best of our knowledge, the rst
attempt of implementing such taxation in practice, and represents an innovation. It is
currently attracting wide interest internationally as other countries contemplate the intro-
duction of similar systems (cf. Auerbach, Devereux and Simpson, 2008). The shareholder
income tax with RRA works in a similar way to a corporate income tax with allowances
for corporate equity (ACE), cf. IFS (1991), but is levied on individual shareholders; i.e.,
at the personal level.
A challenge in the design of shareholder taxation lies in the tension between the con-
sideration with regard to income shifting, tax revenue and equality on the one hand, and
investment incentives and e¢ ciency on the other. In Norway, this dilemma was resolved
by the introduction of the new shareholder tax in 2006, that equalized the marginal tax
rates on labor and shareholder income. The intention was that this tax should avoid the
distortions relating to equity issues and tax capitalization, by allowing the shareholder a
risk-free rate of return protected from taxation through the RRA. Sørensen (2005), for
instance, argues that this property secures neutrality with regard to corporate investment
and nancing decisions. Therefore, the system should be of great interest for tax policy
generally, as it enables taxation of personal shareholder income more in line with the
taxation of wage earners.
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of this form of taxation on the investment and nancing
decisions of closely held rms by means of a theoretical model, where rms have limited
access to capital markets, and shareholders discount rates are allowed to di¤er from
the risk-free rate of return used in the computation of the RRA. To do this we develop a
theoretical framework building on Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), which is especially relevant
for closely held rms and facilitates a comparative analysis of tax systems.
There are di¤erent views on the impact of dividend taxes on rmsinvestment and
nancing decisions and the discussion goes far back in the literature. Under the so called
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old viewon dividend taxation, the marginal source of funds is assumed to be new share
issues. Dividend taxes then reduce the present value of share income and increase the
cost of raising new equity by reducing the investorswillingness to pay for shares. This
makes debt more attractive as a source of nance. It will also reduce real investment in
the corporate sector if equity cannot be fully replaced by debt and can also prevent the
founding of new rms. Thus, according to this view, and as argued by Harberger (1962,
1966), dividend taxes distort the investment decisions of the rm and may prevent the
free allocation of capital in the economy.
Under the new view (or trapped equity view) on dividend taxation developed by
King (1974), Auerbach (1979) and Bradford (1981), the double taxation of dividends does
not necessarily distort the rms investment decisions. According to this view, retained
earnings are the marginal source of nancing, and dividends are paid out of the remaining
cash ow after investment expenditure. Dividend taxes then reduce both the after-tax
opportunity cost and the after-tax return on investments. Thus, as long as the opportunity
cost of retained earnings (i.e., the after-tax dividend income) is reduced by the same
proportion as the corresponding after-tax prot from the investment, the dividend tax
does not distort the rms investment decisions.
Another view builds on a life-cycle model of the rm with three phases; start-up,
growth, and maturity (Sinn, 1991). Young rms are assumed to rely on an initial injection
of equity that, because of the tax distortion, is insu¢ cient to reach a steady state growth
path. The rm will then retain all earnings until it reaches a steady-state where the
marginal productivity is equal to the discount rate. Accordingly, a dividend tax will
reduce initial investments in a startup rm and slow its growth rate for the same reasons
as in the old view. However, at maturity, dividend taxation is neutral so long as the
rm retains some prots and pays dividends (as under the new view). Thus, shareholder
taxation is a more severe problem for entrepreneurship and the foundation of new rms
than existing rms, and the e¢ ciency e¤ects are potentially larger if there is a signicant
portion of young rms relying on external equity in the corporate sector.
The literature on corporate taxes has mostly focused on listed corporations with sep-
aration of ownership and control and where shares are traded in the market, with well
dened risk and returns, capitalization of taxes in the share prices, etc. In this setting,
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a symmetric tax on corporate income, such as capital gains or dividends, may be argued
to be neutral with regard to portfolio decisions because the after-tax risk is reduced pro-
portionally to the reduction in the after tax reward to risk taking. However, when the
equity premium is not due to market risk but to other factors, the standard risk sharing
argument no longer holds. As rst pointed out by Mehra and Prescott (1985), the much
higher return on equity compared with government bonds in the United States in the past
century implies that individuals must have had implausibly high risk aversion according
to standard economic models. Since then, similar observations have been documented in
many other countries (see Graham and Harvey, 2007). One of several explanations for the
equity premium puzzle is market failure, rst and foremost adverse selection and moral
hazard problems, transaction costs and liquidity constraints that prevent individuals from
consumption smoothing over time. Gordon and Hausman (2009) too discuss the concept
of corporate prot in light of the high observed rates of return and propose yet other
explanations. That investorssubjective discount rates may exceed the risk-adjusted dis-
count rate is also a central assumption in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009). Building on Sinns
(1991) life cycle view, they argue that information costs related to adverse selection or
agency costs increase the cost of equity through the discount rate for dividends, and
thereby induce rms to hold a cash bu¤er to smooth random investment expenditures. In
turn, this has implications for the working of dividend taxes when it comes to anticipated
changes in tax rates.
In most countries, closely held companies constitute by far the majority of companies.
They have in common that they do not have the same access to capital markets as traded
rms and are reliant on cash credit and their own working capital.1 In most cases, the
ownermanager will be one and the same person, which means that company-changing
decisions can be made more rapidly. Also, the proximity between the private corporation
and its owner has implications for the nancial policy of the rm. Generally, the owner
(or owner group) will have full control and can easily transfer equity in and out of the rm
without regard to the preferences of other shareholders and conicts of interest. This gives
the rm a high level of exibility when it comes to tax planning. For example, previously
1In most countries, the number of publicly listed rms rarely exceeds two percent of all rms (Wymeer-
sch, 2008). According to Caggese (2007), nancing constraints are mostly relevant for small and privately
owned rms. Caggese (2007) also reports that small rms with less than 100 employees accounted for
about 38 percent of total employment in the US in 1995.
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issued equity can be transferred to the owner tax exempt, similarly to share repurchases
in traded rms. This means that an entrepreneur who initially invests a large amount
of capital in a business project owned by himself does not face a full equity trap but
can withdraw the means any time as only the prot from the investment is taxed. This
fact has been given surprisingly little attention in the literature. Furthermore, retained
prots can instantaneously be converted to issued equity or debt if the owner reinvests the
dividends paid as either new equity or loans. This means that dividends can be stepped
up prior to anticipated tax increases without reducing the nancial strength of the rm
(the latter possibility is disregarded by Korinek and Stiglitz, 2009).
One important implication of the model put forward in this paper is that externally
provided equity is a more costly source of funds for rms than retained earnings. We
argue that the RRA based on the risk-free interest rate is not a su¢ cient allowance (and
thus generates an old viewtype of distortion), while retained earnings are subsidized
by the tax that otherwise would have been paid on dividend distributions; i.e., the tax
irrelevance argument of the new view. If this result holds, the optimal nancial strategy
of rms with holdings of original equity that can be distributed tax exempt (but at the
cost of increased future taxes) would be to retain prots and distribute original equity
(i.e., repurchase shares). Indeed, when confronting our model predictions with trends
in aggregate data before and after the implementation of the shareholder income tax in
Norway in 2006, it appears that closely held rms have adopted exactly this strategy.
This provides some indirect empirical support to the argument that a tax on shareholder
income (with no or insu¢ cient allowance for the opportunity cost of capital) discourages
share issues.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the basic functioning
of the Norwegian shareholder tax system and the role of the RRA. In particular, we
present an equivalent representation of this system, showing that the present value of all
taxes on share income from a given rm under the RRA system equals the present value of
a corporate tax on the equity premium in each period. In Section 3 we derive expressions
for the cost of capital and discuss the nancing incentives for the RRA system, when rms
have limited access to capital markets. We demonstrate that while a tax on the equity
premium is not necessarily neutral when the rm can repurchase shares or return to the
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shareholders the equity raised by an initial share issue, it will be neutral in a steady state.
That is, for a mature rm that relies on retained earnings to fund marginal investment
projects. Section 4 discusses some empirical implications of the model, and shows that
main trends in nancial accounts data before and after the introduction of the tax reform
in Norway in 2006 are in line with the predictions of our theoretical model. Section 5
concludes.
2 Background: How does the RRA system work?
The basic concept of the Norwegian shareholder tax system is the rate of return allowance
(RRA). Here we examine this system at the level of a closely held rm; i.e., aggregating
all the shares in a given rm, and treating them as controlled by a single shareholder.
In the rst year of a startup rm, the RRA equals the risk-free return2 on the injected
share capital, E0:
RRA1 = rE0. (1)
If Dt denotes dividends distributed in period t and Tt is shareholder taxes paid in period
t, then
Tt = (Dt  RRAt)+, (2)
where x+  max(x; 0). The evolution of RRA (at the rm level), provided there is no
change in the share capital (new share issuance or repurchases of shares), is determined
by the di¤erence equation
RRAt = rE0 + (1 + r)(RRAt 1  Dt 1)+, t = 2; :::; T . (3)
Thus, current RRA is obtained by adding the previous periods unused RRA, (RRAt 1 
Dt 1)+, with interests, to the risk-free return on the initial share capital, rE0. In (3), E0
is the basis for RRA and r is the risk-free interest rate. If new share capital is injected
into the rm or original share capital is distributed to the shareholder through share
repurchases, the basis is changed by the same amount (and may thus generally di¤er from
the original share capital, E0). The case of share repurchases is deferred to Section 4. If
2Since interest-bearing securities are taxed, the rate of return is calculated by the after tax rate on
short-term government securities.
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not explicitly stated otherwise, it is henceforth assumed that the basis is unchanged and
equal to E0 for all t.
The above system is not very intuitive, except for the rst period, where the tax is
a pure equity premium tax: T1 = (D1   rE0)+; i.e., dividends in excess of the risk-free
rate of return on equity are taxed at rate  in the rst period. It is thus interesting to
consider the case where Ds = 0 for s = 1; :::; t; i.e., all earnings are retained by the rm
in t consecutive periods. Then
RRAt+1 = r[1 + (1 + r) + :::+ (1 + r)
t]E0
=

(1 + r)t+1   1E0.
We see that RRAt is equal to the accumulated earnings after t periods of an initial
investment E0 with an annual rate of return equal to r. This shows that the RRA
system shields the risk-free returns on an investment from taxation, regardless of when
shareholder income is realized. To illustrate the working of the system in the case where
the shareholder earns a return in excess of the risk-free return, we next, after introducing
some notation that will be used throughout the paper, consider a two-period example.
Let Mt denote the rms working capital at the end of period t after the realization
of prots, t, but before payment of dividends, Dt. Furthermore, let Et denote the rms
equity after dividends, Dt, have been distributed. Thus
Mt = Et 1 +t, Et =Mt  Dt (4)
(assuming no share repurchases or issuance of new equity). In the example, let the rate
of return in period 1 be r where r is the risk-free interest rate and  > 1. Dividends
paid at the end of period 1 are D1 = rE0. We require that    so that the initial
share capital is not reduced. This is a pure technicality, as the di¤erence (   )+ would
correspond to the repurchase of initial share capital, that is tax exempt. At the end of
period 2, all retained prots are distributed to the shareholder. We assume that the rate
of return in period 2 is equal to r. The rms decision problem at the beginning of period
1 is then to maximize the present value of share income net of taxes with respect to .
By assuming that the rate of return in period 2 is r, any investment decision problem in
period 1 is abstracted away, so the problem is equivalent to minimizing the present value
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of the tax liabilities. The neutrality of the tax system would imply that the choice of 
does not a¤ect this present value.
Example 1: (RRA in a two-period model). Assume that 1 = rE0 with  > 1,
D1 = rE0 with   , 2 = rE1 and D2 =M2   E2 (thus E2 = E0). Shareholder taxes
paid in period 1 and 2 are, respectively,
T1 = (   1)+rE0 and T2 = (1 + r)

(  1)  (   1)+ rE0,
and the present value of all paid taxes is given by
T1 +
1
1 + r
T2 = (  1)rE0. (5)
The detailed calculations are shown in the Appendix. Since the present value is indepen-
dent of , the neutrality claim in Sørensen (2005) is conrmed in this example.
An equivalent formulation of the RRA system We now show that there is an
equivalent representation of the tax system discussed above, which is more intuitive and
also mathematically more transparent. First, we distinguish between the taxes the share-
holder actually pays in period t, Tt, and the tax liabilities, ATt. These are related by a
linear di¤erence equation:
ATt+1 = (t+1   rEt) + (1 + r)(ATt   Tt), with AT0 = T0 = 0, (6)
where Tt is paid taxes according to the RRA system (2). Tax liabilities at the end of year
t+ 1 can now in each period be decomposed into two parts:
accrued tax: (t+1   rEt) (7)
and
tax liability carried forward: (1 + r)(ATt   Tt)
= (1 + r)(ATt   (Dt  RRAt)+),
i.e., the tax liability from the previous period less the actual tax payment, ATt   Tt,
carried forward with interests. It follows directly from (6) that
(1 + r) tATt + (1 + r) t+1Tt 1 + ::::+ (1 + r) 1T1 = (1 + r) t(t   rEt 1) + ::::
+(1 + r) 1(1   rE0). (8)
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Thus, if ATt = Tt in any termination period t (when all capital gains are realized), the
present value of all tax payments is equal to the right hand side of (8) regardless of the
periodization of taxes. The reason is that any tax liability carries forward with interests
to the next period. That this condition is fullled for the RRA system is established in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Assuming that Ts, s  t, is determined by the RRA system (2), then in
any termination period t when all share income is realized
Tt = ATt (9)
and
(1 + r) tTt + (1 + r) t+1Tt 1 + ::::+ (1 + r) 1T1 = (1 + r) t(t   rEt 1) + ::::
+(1 + r) 1(1   rE0). (10)
The proof is given in the Appendix. The proof requires that any negative tax liability
in the termination period, ATt < 0, can be converted to a negative tax (or transferred
to a new shareholder).3 Proposition 1 thus establishes a form of equivalence between
the personal-based RRA and the corporate-based ACE systems. It is easy to show that
Proposition 1 holds for the two-period model in Example 1:
Example 1 (continued). We obtain
AT1 = (  1)rE0; T1 = (   1)+rE0
AT2 = (1 + r)

(  1)  (   1)+ rE0 = T2
(cf. (31) and (33) in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 can be modied to the case with innitely lived rms (or shares that
are held for an indenite period of time). Then the termination condition (9) does not
apply, but if (1 + r) t(t   rEt 1)! 0, then (10) holds in the limit as t!1. This case
is illustrated below.
3In the Norwegian implementation of the RRA system, unutilized RRA cannot be converted into a
negative tax or transferred when shares are sold or the rm is liquidated, contrary to what is assumed
here. Our assumption is, however, in accordance with the original proposal of Sørensen (2005).
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Example 1 (continued). Assume that  = 1 in the rst period: D1 = rE0 and that,
from period 2 and onwards, Dt = t = rEt, i.e., all prot is the normal return on the
equity, Et, which is distributed as dividends in each period. Thus Et = (1 + (   1)r)E0
is a steady state. In this example, RRAt = rE0 for all t by ( 3), as Dt  RRAt in all
periods. Then T1 = 0 and,
Tt = (rEt  RRAt)+ = r(Et   E0)
= (  1)r2E0 for t > 1:
The present value in year 1 of paid taxes is thus
1X
s=1
(1 + r) s(  1)r2E0 = (  1)rE0 = (1   rE0),
cf. (5).
It is important to remember that the neutrality results discussed here are contingent
on after-tax prots and that investment and nancing decisions are abstracted away. In
particular, the possible e¤ect of the tax on the cost of capital, or on the access to funding
when rms are nancially constrained, have not been addressed. Moreover, it is assumed
that the risk-free interest rate is used to discount future share income. These issues are
addressed in the remaineder of the paper.
3 Financing investments in the presence of a share-
holder tax: A formal model
Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) build on the life cycle view of Sinn (1991). Here, growth rms
are assumed to be capital constrained in the sense that it is costly to raise new capital in
the short run. This means that rms will be reliant on some level of retained earnings in
order to bu¤er random uctuations in investment requirements. In accordance with the
new view, Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) too conclude that a dividend tax will not a¤ect
a mature rm as long as the tax rate is expected to be constant. However, anticipated
changes in the tax rate will induce rms to participate in intertemporal income shifting
through the timing of dividend payments. This will a¤ect the rms cash holdings and, in
11
turn, its level of investment. Similar to the life cycle view (and the old view), the optimal
amount of new equity to be raised by a new rm is decreasing in the dividend tax rate
and in the cost of raising external equity in the market.
Our model shares three features of the model in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009). First,
investment opportunities occur randomly. Second, because rms have limited access to
equity capital markets, investments are nanced either by retained earnings or by debt 
at a high interest rate rb > r that includes a premium to account for agency costs. (The
latter opportunity is disregarded by Korinek and Stiglitz, but increases the realism of our
model). Third, equity investors require more than the risk-free interest rate r for holding
cash in the company, even in the absence of market risk. Thus, future cash ows are
discounted at rate r, which is higher than the risk-free interest rate.
In closely held rms, the owners will normally be able to undertake capital withdrawals
and injections or to convert equity to debt and vice versa without regard to the preferences
of other shareholders and conicts of interest. This gives a high degree of exibility when
it comes to tax planning. In contrast, the Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) model is an example
of a full equity trap with all payments from the rm to the shareholder being taxed at
the rate  . We modify this model such that: (i) only share income in excess of the RRA
is taxed and (ii) the payback of injected equity capital is tax exempt. Assumption (ii) is
consistent with the tax systems in all countries we are know of and is clearly important
for closely held rms. While the tax motivated acceleration of dividends in advance
of an anticipated tax hike (to avoid the equity trap) will lead to capital drain in the
model in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), in our setup, dividends can be reinvested as new
equity because of the close relationship between the rm and its owner. Consequently,
dividends can serve as a remedy for converting accumulated retained earnings into new,
external equity. In our model, temporary distortions related to anticipated tax changes
will therefore be of less importance.
The discount rate on rmsfuture dividend distributions. In Korinek and Stiglitzs
(2009) model, the high discount rate that applies to dividends is justied by assuming
agency problems between the owners and managers of rms. As originally formulated by
Myers and Majluf (1984), such agency problems arise because of asymmetric information
between insiders and external investors. Consequently, when a closely held corporation ap-
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plies for a loan or invites outsiders to contribute with new equity, an external investor will
take into consideration the possibility that a disloyal owner with access to external funds
will increase withdrawals from the rm through dividends or the owners wage, to nance
private expenses. This is an example of the moral hazard element of external nancing. A
corresponding problem of more widely held rms with hired management is agency costs
relating to the possibility that hired management will maximize size (growth) rather than
prots. Also, a rational owner-manager with inside information may prefer to nance
goodprojects using his own resources but go to external investors (new shareholders
or lending institutions) if the project implies more risk for a given expected return. This
is the adverse selection element of external nancing. Of course, these agency problems
that contribute to reduce the discount factor on rmsfuture dividend payments apply
equally to listed rms with publicly traded shares and closely held rms, but obviously
they will be more prevalent the stronger the inuence of one dominant owner (or group
of owners) and the closer the link between management and the owner(s). In the pure
case of one owner who also manages the rm, there will be a signicant risk that banks or
other external investors will be misled. This results in countermeasures such as collateral
requirements and a substantial information premium on capital.
Even if agency problems are important, there are several other reasons why investors
could discount dividends at a higher rate than the risk-free interest rate (apart from the
risk premium associated with market risk4): First, historically, the equity premium is
worldwide (much) greater than what can be justied as a reasonable trade-o¤ between
risk and return (Fama and French, 2002, Graham and Harvey, 2007, Mehra and Prescott,
1985, and Mehra, 2003). There are several proposed explanations for this equity premium
puzzle; see Mehra (2003). One of the latest contributions is provided by Constantinides,
Donaldson and Mehra (2002). Here, young investors have higher willingness to pay for
equity than the middle aged, but they are prevented from doing so by borrowing con-
straints. Thus, risky securities are underpriced because the middle aged to a greater
extent prefer less risky securities. Second, borrowing constraints may also work directly,
as ownermanagers of closely held rms themselves can be liquidity constrained, implying
that the ownersdiscount rate would be at least as high as the interest rate on risky debt,
4As in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), we do not focus on market risk in this paper.
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rb.5 Rather than acquiring loans in the market for risky debt or even more costly external
equity, a liquidity-constrained ownermanager may borrow from himselfby postponing
the distribution of prots. In that case, the ownermanager will be impatient, in the
sense that the reward to waiting determined by the interest rate is less than the cost of
waiting. The more impatient the owner is, the more costly is the retention of prots, and
following, for example, Carrol (2001), the degree of impatience will depend on preferences
and expected income growth. A liquidity-constrained ownermanager will face a higher
discount rate, the more current consumption is forsaken to undertake an investment.
A formal model We consider a decision problem, where dividends are paid at the end
of the current period (period 1) and investment decisions are made at the beginning of
the next period (period 2). The rm optimizes the after-tax present value of dividends
paid at the end of period 1 and the rms net worth at the end of period 2 (as if all shares
were sold). Under the conditions in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), it is easily shown that this
two-period decision problem is equivalent to the innite horizon decision problem where
investors maximize the present value of dividends net of taxes. For the same reasons we
also assume away ordinary taxes on corporate prot.
The decision problem at the end of period 1 is to choose D, given the predetermined
variables M , AT1 and RRA1 (period 1can denote an arbitrary period in the rms life
history). Then E = M   D is equity after dividend payments at the end of period 1.
Period 2 consists of two stages (two information sets): before and after the realization of
the binary random variable , which takes the value of 1 if an investment opportunity
occurs during period 2 and 0 otherwise. We assume that Pr( = 1) = p. Moreover, I is
investments made during period 2, and F (I) is the prot function (before capital costs,
but net of variable factor costs), satisfying F 00(I) < 0 . The investment is fully depreciated
after one period. The risk-free interest rate (net of taxes) is r, and the rms discount
rate is  = 1=(1 + r) with r > r. The rm can nance the investments from working
capitalM D or by external funds by issuing bonds, B, at an interest rate rb > r. Thus,
5For the theoretical basis and empirical signicance of borrowing constraints among households in
general, see Deaton (1991), Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Gross and Souleles (2002) and Zeldes (1989).
For the signicance of of borrowing constraints on business owners and the relationship between initial
personal wealth and subsequent business entry see Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton
(1989) and Quadrini (1999).
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we can decompose the rms decision problem into two stages:
 In period 1 (before  is realized): choose D given M , AT1 and RRA1
 In period 2 (after  is realized): choose I and B.
The period 2 optimization problem: Optimal B and I We denote with V (0) and
V (1), respectively, the rms total assets in period 2 net of the accrued tax (7), given that
 = 0 and  = 1, respectively. Since, obviously, there is no equity premium when  = 0
and, moreover,  = 0) B = 0, it is clear that
V (0) = (1 + r)(M  D):
Conversely, if  = 1, there is a taxation of prots in excess of the risk-free returns on
equity, r(M  D):
accrued tax: (  r(M  D)).
From (6), the total tax liabilities, AT2, at the beginning of period 2 are
AT2 = accrued tax+ (1 + r)(AT1   T1), (11)
where
T1 = (D  RRA1)+ (12)
and AT1 and RRA1 are predetermined at the beginning of period 1.
Revenue in period 2 if  = 1 then consists of
revenue from risk-free nancial investment: r(M +B  D   I)
+revenue from real investment: F (I):
The costs consist of
interest payments on bonds: rbB
+depreciation: I:
Thus,
 = r(M +B  D   I) + F (I)  rbB   I:
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Accrued tax in period 2 can be expressed as
(  r(M  D))
=  [r(M +B  D   I) + F (I)  rbB   I)  r(M  D)]
=  [F (I)  (rb   r)B   (1 + r)I] :
Thus,
V (1) = max
I0;B0
[(1 + r)(M +B  D   I)  (1 + rb)B + F (I)   (F (I)  (1 + r)I   (rb   r)B)]
= max
I0;B0
[(1 + r)(M  D) + (1  )(F (I)  (1 + r)I   (rb   r)B)] ,
subject to
I  B M  D. (13)
The corresponding Lagrangian is
L(; I; B) = (1+ r)(M  D) + (1  )(F (I)  (1+ r)I   (rb  r)B)  (I  B M +D):
Assuming I > 0, the rst-order conditions are
@L(; I; B)
@I
= (1  )(F 0(I)  (1 + r))   = 0
, F 0(I) = (1 + r) + 
1  
@L(; I; B)
@B
=  (1  )(rb   r) +   0 ( = 0 if B > 0). (14)
If B > 0, then
 = (1  )(rb   r)
F 0(I) = 1 + rb:
On the other hand, if (13) is not binding, then  = 0, B = 0 and
F 0(I) = (1 + r):
Finally, if (13) is binding and B = 0, then
 = (1  )(F 0(M  D)  (1 + r)): (15)
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The period 1 optimization problem: Optimal D Let us now consider the
problem of nding the optimal dividend policy. As V (0) and V (1) are functions only of
M  D, we dene
V (M  D) = (1  p)V (0) + pV (1):
Using the envelope theorem for non-linear programming (see Sydsæter and Hammond,
1995, p. 680)
dV (0)
dM
= (1 + r);
dV (1)
dM
= (1 + r + ),
implying
V 0(M  D) = 1 + r + p: (16)
The expected present value of share income net of total tax liabilities (11) at the end
of period 1 (when  is not yet realized) is
max
D
(D;M;AT1; RRA1), (17)
where M , AT1, RRA1 are predetermined, and
(D;M;AT1; RRA1) = D (D RRA1)++

V (M  D)  (1 + r)(AT1   (D  RRA1)+)

:
(18)
The general solution must satisfy either D = 0, D = M (a corner solution),D = RRA1
(a kink point) or
@(D;M;AT1; RRA1)
@D
= 0 (19)
(a stationary point). Let us rst look at an optimum point that satises (19) with D <
RRA1. By (18) and (19):
1 = V 0(M  D). (20)
That is, the after-tax present value of a unit investment nanced by retained earnings
must equal one. From (16)
(1 + r + p) = 1()
 =
(r   r)
p
 (1  )(rb   r) (21)
(using (14)). Finally, combining (15) and (21) and dening E
0
as the solution to the
equation
F 0(E
0
) = (1 + r) +
r   r
p(1  ) , (22)
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we can conclude that in an optimum with 0 < D < RRA1:
(r   r)
p(1  ) > rb   r )M  D = 0, I = B and F
0(I) = 1 + rb
(r   r)
p(1  )  rb   r )M  D = E
0
, B = 0, I = E
0
.
The tax on the equity premium unambiguously increases the marginal cost of capital
for rms that satisfy (r
 r)
p
 rb   r, i.e., whose marginal source of funding is retained
earnings. Their marginal cost increases from (1 + r) + (r   r)=p to either 1 + rb or
(1 + r) + (r   r)=p(1  ).
Next consider a solution with D > RRA1. Then, the rst order condition (19) gives
1   =  [V 0(M  D)  (1 + r) ] : (23)
The left-hand side of (23) expresses the opportunity cost of a unit investment nanced by
retained earnings otherwise subject to dividend taxation. The right-hand side comprises
two parts: (i) the present value of a unit investment net of accrued tax, V 0(M   D),
and (ii) the negative present value of the postponed tax,  (1+r) . Combining (16) and
(23), we obtain
1   =  [p+ (1 + r)(1  )]()
 = (1  )(r
   r)
p
. (24)
Then, from (15) and (24), it follows that the optimal D is given by D =M E 00 > RRA1,
where E
00
is the solution to
F 0(E
00
) = (1 + r) +
(r   r)
p
. (25)
Hence, in this case the tax does not distort the marginal investment decision. The reason
is that the marginal source of nancing is retained earnings which otherwise would have
been taxed at the rate  . The general solution is summed up in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Optimal dividends policy) For a rm with positive equity, M  D > 0,
the optimal choice of D as a function of M and RRA1 is characterized by
M  E 0 ) D = 0
M 2 (E 0 ; E 00)) D = min(M   E 0; RRA1)
M  E 00 ) D = max(M   E 00 ; RRA1). (26)
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The proof is in the Appendix. It follows immediately that if r = r, the tax is neutral,
as then E 0 = E
00
and F 0(E
0
) = 1 + r (from (22) and (25)). The rms dividends policy
will then be independent of  .
By replacing period 1with period t, the above results suggest a life cycle path
towards the steady state. However, if r > r, there are two candidates for a steady state:
E
0
and E
00
. The rst requires that Dt = Mt   E 0 < RRAt, whereas the second requires
that Dt =Mt E 00 > RRAt. We next show that the only possible steady state is Et = E 00,
where the rms dividends policy is una¤ected by the tax.
Proposition 3 (Steady state) In steady state Et = E
00
, where E
00
is dened in (25),
Dt =Mt   E 00 and RRAt = rE0.
The proof is in the Appendix.
A life cycle interpretation of Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 is as follows: Equipped
with an initial share capital E0, the rm will grow internally by retaining all prots
until Et = E
0
, where the marginal return to a unit investment is 1. Since the RRA
will be large when the rm starts paying dividends, the condition Mt   E 0 < RRAt will
be satised initially, so E
0
= Mt   D0t. However, by paying out all subsequent prots
as dividends, eventually Dt  RRAt, implying that RRAt+1 = rE0. Then the level of
dividends consistent with Et = E 0, i.e., Dt = Mt   E 0, implies that dividends will be
taxed at the margin. It is then optimal to retain all prots exceeding RRAt (which would
otherwise be taxed, and therefore have a lower opportunity costs). The rm will then
grow towards E
00
. Beyond that point, the rm will return all prots as dividends and the
steady state is reached.
As in Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), it is straightforward to analyze the decision to inject
equity into the rm. Assume that for each unit of equity raised by share issuance, E0, the
investor pays an additional premium of   0 in transaction costs. The optimal amount
of equity raised is then as follows:
Proposition 4 (Equity issuance) The optimal amount of equity E0 raised is determined
by the condition
F 0(E0) = (1 + r) +
(r   r) + (1 + r)
p(1  ) : (27)
19
The proof follows immediately by noting that an injection of new capital is equivalent
to a negative D in (18) except for the marginal cost, , of raising equity. Thus the rst
order condition follows from (21), with the right hand side equal to 1 +  instead of 1.
We can see that the tax is not neutral with respect to share issuance unless r = r and
 = 0. However, it is also clear that a at tax without RRA leads to the condition
F 0(E0) =
1
1  

(1 + r) +
(r   r) + (1 + r)
p

. (28)
Thus, the shareholder tax with RRA distorts the initial investment to a lesser degree.
4 Some empirical implications: How do rms per-
ceive their after-tax cost of equity capital?
The above analysis did not take into consideration the possibility that rms may return
the original equity to the investors as an alternative to paying dividends. Nevertheless,
when previously issued equity can be transferred tax exempt and
F 0(Et) < (1 + r) +
(r   r)
p(1  ) , (29)
this is exactly what the rm should do. The condition (29) follows from (27) with  = 0,
i.e., assuming that no costs are related to the payback of original share capital. Firms
should then use retained prots to nance these cash distributions. This possibility is
certainly recognized by Sinn (1991, p. 294): ..(by payback of injected share capital,
rms may).. largely avoid the double taxation of dividends.. (indicating).. a loophole
in the classical imputation systems of capital income taxation. However, Sinn (1991)
rules this possibility out of the model, as he argues that most countries have closed this
loophole6. As it would be highly discouraging for anyone to invest in shares or to inject
capital into his own business if not only the return but also the injected capital itself were
subject to taxation, we nd this assumption untenable. In Norway, tax-exempt return
of original equity is legal until the rm eventually reaches the minimum share capital
requirement of NOK 50,000. In the European Union, share repurchases are limited to 10
percent of the subscribed capital, but to our knowledge, there are no similar restrictions
6For example, in the US at that time, the return of capital could not occur before current prots and
all accumulated reserves had been paid out.
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on the write-down of share capital with the return of capital to shareowners.7 Lindhe
and Södersten (2009) construct a model with dividend taxes where the optimal payout
policy of a young rm with a remaining stock from past equity injections would be rst
to use current prots and possibly some disinvestment to undertake repayment of the
original equity. Then, after all injected equity has been repaid, the rm will retain prots
and grow using internal funds until the marginal product of capital net of depreciation is
equal to the discount rate, as in Sinn (1991). This policy of repayment of equity simply
means that the rms payout is re-labeled to avoid taxation, and need not necessarily
a¤ect the rms equity or total assets. So, one should expect to nd share repurchases
(i.e., distribution of past equity injections) among immature rms when there is a tax on
shareholder income.
It remains an unresolved empirical question to what extent dividend taxation actually
does discourage investments through its e¤ect on the cost of external equity. For example,
the ndings in Poterba and Summers (1985) support the traditional view, while Auerbach
and Hassett (2003) nd evidence in support of the tax irrelevance view. In addition, the
life cycle view implies that rms may have di¤erent nancial strategies in di¤erent stages
of their life cycle. We shall now illustrate how a mature, dividend-paying rm that
possesses original equity that can be returned tax exempt to the shareowners can increase
the after-tax present value of the cash ow to the owners by delaying tax payments.
Technically, this means that the rm will retain prots instead of paying dividends, and
the total amount of equity in the rm need not be a¤ected. This policy would then only
be worthwhile if the discount rate r exceeded the risk-free interest rate r and would only
be possible if the rm had su¢ cient original equity to redistribute. The latter condition
is typically fullled after the introduction of a dividend tax, as is currently the case in
Norway.
A formal discussion of this issue requires that the basis E0 in (3) be replaced by a
time varying basis, Bt. Initially B0 = E0, whereas
Bt+1 = Bt + new equity issuance
 return of injected share capital:
7However, share repurchases at overcharge would be considered tax evasion.
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Assume now that the prot rate including an equity premium is  > r.8 Thus, with
the notation of Example 1, t = Et;  = r and  > 1. Assume also that the rm
distributes all its prots in the two periods 1 and 2 and that all share capital is returned
to the owner at the end of period 2. At the beginning of period 1, the rm is endowed
with an amount of initial equity E0 which also forms the basis for the RRA: B1 = E0.
While the prot is E0, the tax is T1 = (   r)E0. If the rm chooses to distribute
an amount E0 out of the initial equity rather than paying dividends, T1 = 0 and the
shareholders receive an additional amount of (   r)E0 compared with the alternative
of paying dividends. In period 2, the prot of E0 is distributed as dividends and the
equity is returned to the owner. With both policies Et = E0 and t = Et for t = 1; 2.
If dividends are paid this gives a tax of T2 = (  r)E0 also in period 2, but if the rm
distributes original equity, the tax is T2 = AT2 = (  r)E0 + (1 + r)(  r)E0 using
(6), with T1 = 0, and Proposition 1.9 The period 1 present value of the tax savings in
both periods of repayment of original equity rather than dividend payment is then
(  r)E0   (1 + r)(  r)E0
(1 + r)
E0
= (  r)(r
   r)
(1 + r)
E0 > 0.
Firms with available initial equity then potentially gain from substituting the past
equity injections with retained prots and pay back initial equity rather than paying out
dividends. Retained prots will eventually be subject to tax in the future, either as a
capital gains tax or when the prots are distributed, but there is still a substantial tax
advantage from this policy.
The signicance of the tax credit can also be illustrated by holding the net cash ow
to the shareowners constant in all periods from t = 1 until T and assuming that the
tax credit (   r)E0 is retained in the rm. In period T , all capital gains are realized.
8If the prot rate only reects the equity premium then  simply equals r, but the unpaid work e¤ort
from active owner-managers can increase the prot rate as measured in the accounts far beyond r.
9Proposition 1 is also valid for the case where the original share capital is returned to the owner (i.e.,
there is a change in the basis for RRA): The basis for RRA in period 2, B2, is reduced to B2 = (1 )E0,
whereas RRA2 = rB2 + (1 + r)rE0. Total share income in period 2 is therefore the sum of prots,
E0, and (taxable) capital gains E0   B2 = E0. Total share income tax in period 2 is therefore
T2 = (2E0  RRA2), which is easily seen to be equal to the expression for AT2 in this example.
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Furthermore, assume that  = r and, with reference to the formal model in Section 3,
p = 1. Then Dt = Et and Et = E0 for all t satisfy the optimiality condition (25),
although this is not a unique steady state, as we have now assumed constant returns-to-
scale. The net dividend received by the owners is E0   (  r)E0. Note that (29) also
holds, so tax planning opportunities do exist. For example, if the rm chooses instead
to distribute the same annual amount by repayment of equity, it will be able to retain
an amount of Rt = Et   E0 + (  r)E0 = (Et   E0) + (  r)E0 each year, where
(   r)E0 is the annual tax saving compared with the alternative of paying dividends
and (Et   E0) is the additional prot in period t from the accumulation of capital in
previous periods. This strategy will induce a tax-driven growth rate of the rm given by
gt =
Et+1
Et
  1 = 

1  E0
Et

+  (  r) E0
Et
. (30)
Then g0 =  (  r), limt!1 gt = , gt > 0 and 2gt < 0. The growth rate of Et is then
decreasing towards  as t increases.
Figure 1 displays two examples of how the value of a tax-planning rm that repays
original equity rather than paying dividends may evolve over time. The prot rate ( = r)
is assumed to be 6 percent, while r = 0:03 and  = 0:28. Total total value of initial assets
(E0) is normalized to 1. The benchmark policy is that the entire annual prot, Et, is
paid out as dividends. This will give the owner a cash ow equal to CF =   (  r),
while Et = 1 for all t. To examine the potential gain by using repayment of original
equity as a substitute for paying dividends, the values corresponding to two tax planning
alternatives, net of accrued future tax liabilities, are displayed in Figure 1. The rst
alternative is to retain all prots (Dt = 0) and to pay the whole amount CF from the
initial equity. As all the subsequent returns fed by these tax savings are kept in the rm,
the rms value will grow approximately exponentially at rate  when T becomes large, as
in (30). This increase in value will continue, even if the original equity is drained (in which
case Bt = 0). The second alternative is to pay dividends equal to the tax-free amount
(Dt = RRAt), and paying the di¤erence CF  Dt out of the initial equity. As shown in
Figure 1, this gives a smaller tax advantage than paying all cash to the owners out of
the original equity. The reason is that the unused RRA that arises when Dt < RRAt is
carried forward with interest giving an amount of (1 + r)r of increased RRA per unit,
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while one unit of Bt that is saved for the next period only gives r. Thus, it is optimal to
choose Dt as small as possible (given CF ).
Some evidence from aggregate data In principle, the introduction of the shareholder
income tax in Norway in 2006 provides an opportunity to test empirically how rms
perceive the cost of external equity versus the retention of prots. Fjærli and Alstadsæter
(2009) document strong timing e¤ects in dividend payments immediately before and after
the 2006 tax reform. This is in line with Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), who predict that an
anticipated tax increase will lead to accelerated dividend payments prior to the reform,
and possibly a shortage of funds. According to our model rms would commence the
repayment of equity after the introduction of a shareholder income tax rather than paying
dividends, until all repayable equity is returned to shareowners. The possibility to repay
external equity later on means that an owner-manager could then be willing to reinvest
the increase in dividend payments prior to the reform in order to maintain the desired
level of working capital.
A microeconometric investigation of the e¤ects of the reform on nancial policy is
beyond the scope of the present paper, but our results appear to be in accordance with
prevailing patterns of equity repayments found in the latest aggregate statistics from
Statistics Norway. Table 1 shows the net reinvestment of dividends by households minus
the rms repayment of equity to the same shareholders from the National Accounts
(Financial Accounts). These are based on the tax return data for the largest individual
shareowners, in turn accounting for the bulk of total dividends in the household sector.
As shown in Table 1, large shareowners reinvest dividends before the 2006 tax reform,
implying a conversion of retained earnings to external equity. In 2001, when there was
a temporary tax on dividends, the repayment of equity exceeded reinvestments, and this
recurs from 2006 onwards. Table 1 illustrates the nancial exibility of closely held rms,
and clearly indicates that these rms and their principal owners are aware of the diverse
costs of di¤erent types of equity. Table 2 shows the time prole of dividends paid to the
household sector from 2004 to 2008, using the shareholder statistics (all households). 10
Figure 2 shows how the observed change in corporate distributions a¤ects the ratio of
10The latest gures from the shareholder register show that for the sum of total distributions from
non-listed and listed rms, return of equity was around 42 per cent of total cash payments to individuals
in 2007 and 21 per cent in 2008. (http://www.ssb.no/aksjer_en/tab-2009-06-24-01-en.html)
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accumulated retained earnings to the accumulated issued equity in the balance sheets of
some 15,000 closely held rms owned by the largest recipients of dividends in Norway in
2004. Before the 2006 tax reform, the stock of retained earnings falls because of high
dividend distributions, partly reinvested as newequity. Following the reform, retained
earnings increase sharply compared with issued equity as repayment of equity replaces
distribution of dividends.
Overall, the aggregate data from di¤erent sources illustrate our point in Section 3 that
closely held rms have a high degree of nancial exibility that allows them to participate
in tax planning. Most importantly, their behavior is consistent with the view that rms
minimize their after tax cost of capital, by disposing of the previously injected external
equity and increasing the use of retained prots.
5 Concluding remarks
It is generally believed that full taxation of shareholder income distorts investments -
nanced by new equity issues because of tax capitalization but not investments nanced
with retained earnings as they are taxed at the margin. Therefore, the taxation of share-
holder income is probably a less severe problem for mature rms than for the formation
of new rms. In turn, this can hamper change-over in the economy through the adverse
e¤ect on entrepreneurship from a lower after-tax yield. The shareholder income tax with
rate of return allowance has the same nice properties with respect to the investment in-
centives for mature, dividend-paying rms as the standard dividend tax under the new
view. Even if the shareholder income tax with RRA is not neutral when it comes to
investments nanced by new equity when the discount rate exceeds the risk-free rate,
taxing only the equity premium still reduces distortions compared with a full taxation of
shareholder income.
An important point to keep in mind is that closely held rms have greater nancial
exibility than listed rms. Retained earnings can be converted into external, new
equity through reinvestment of dividends. This means that tax rate changes give less
distortons than in the KorinekStiglitz model where anticipated tax increases cause cash
outows and temporary shortage of funds.
In line with our model, aggregate statistics provide clear indications that closely held
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rms behave fundamentally di¤erently than widely held and listed rms. Aggregate ac-
counts data from the initial years following the implementation of the shareholder income
tax in Norway indicate that rms really do behave as if external equity is more costly
than internal equity, and this is consistent with the predictions of our model.
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Figure 1: The relative after-tax value of a dividend paying rm (normalized to one) and a
tax-planning rm that distributes original equity as a substitute for paying out dividends.
The tax-planning rm is assumed to retain either all (D = 0) or parts of the prot
(D = RRA). The annual after-tax cash ow to the owner is equal to CF for all three
alternatives.
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Table 1: Reinvested dividends minus negative share issues (repaid equity) by
year. Households. Bill. NOK
Year Reinvested dividends Marginal tax rate on
minus repayment of equity dividends (percent)
2000 12 0
2001  3 11
2002 21 0
2003 37 0
2004 39 0
2005 75 0
2006  14 28
2007  15 28
2008  12 28
Source: National Accounts. Financial Accounts (Statistics Norway)
Table 2: Dividends paid to households and non-prot institutions serving
households. Bill. NOK
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Listed rms 1:9 2:5 2:9 2:2 2:5
Unlisted rms 61:7 101:0 4:9 13:8 20:4
Source: Statistics Norway
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Figure 2: Ratio of accumulated retained earnings to accumulated issued equity in 13,815
closely held rms that paid more than 500,000 NOK in dividends to the principal share-
holder in 2004. Source: Statistics Norway
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Appendix
Example 1: Detailed calculations In period 1 we obtain, from (1):
D1 = rE0
T1 = (   1)+rE0: (31)
Equity (working capital) at the end of period 1 is then
E1 = E0 +1  D1 = (1 + r   r)E0 = (1 + (  )r)E0:
Period 2s RRA equals
RRA2 = rE0 + (1 + r)(RRA1  D1)+ (32)
= r
 
1 + (1 + r)(1  )+E0:
In period 2, the rms rate of return on E1 is r:
2 = rE1 = r(1 + (  )r)E0;
while the rms working capital at the end of period 2 is
M2 = (1 + r)E1 = (1 + r)(1 + (  )r)E0:
We have assumed that at the end of period 2 all capital gains are returned to the owner
as dividends, i.e.
D2 = M2   E0 = (r + (  )r2)E0 + (  )rE0
= (1 + (  )(1 + r)) rE0:
Thus only the initial equity E0 remains in the rm at the end of period 2: E2 = E0.
Let us now examine the optimal choice of . Let us rst examine  < 1. Then
RRA2 = r (1 + (1 + r)(1  ))E0
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and
T2 =  [D2  RRA2] =  [(1 + (  )(1 + r))rE0   (1 + (1 + r)(1  )) rE0]+
=  [(  )(1 + r)  (1 + r)(1  )] rE0
= (1 + r)(  1)rE0: (33)
Next, let us consider the choice   1. Then, since    , we must have   1 for this
case to be relevant. Then
RRA2 = rE0
T2 =  [(1 + (  )(1 + r)) rE0   rE0]+
= (  )(1 + r)rE0.
Proof of Proposition 1 We only prove the proposition for t = 2. The general case
follows by analogy, but is more tedious. For t = 2 it is su¢ cient to prove that
(1 + r)T1 + T2 = (1 + r)(1   rE0) + (2   rE1).
Then AT2 = T2 follows from (8). From (4), Et = Et 1+t Dt. Hence D1 = E0 E1+1
and D2 = E1 +2   E0 (since E2 = E0 by assumption). We then have
(1 + r)T1 + T2 = (1 + r)(D1   rE0)+ + 

D2  
 
rE0 + (1 + r)(rE0  D1)+

=  [(1 + r)(D1   rE0) + (D2   rE0)] :
Moreover
(1 + r)(1   rE0) + (2   rE1) =  [(1 + r)(D1 + E1   E0   rE0) + (D2   E1 + E0   rE1)]
=  [(1 + r)(D1   rE0) +D2   rE0] ,
and the conclusion follows. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 2 From (18) and the denitions of E 0 and E 00
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
:
8<:
= 0 if M  D = E 0 ; D < RRA1
< 0 if M  D < E 0 ; D < RRA1
> 0 if M  D > E 0 ; D < RRA1
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
:
8<:
= 0 if M  D = E 00 ; D > RRA1
< 0 if M  D < E 00 ; D > RRA1
> 0 if M  D > E 00 ; D > RRA1.
Then M  E 0 implies @(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
< 0 independently of RRA1, hence D = 0 in
optimum. Moreover, M 2 (E 0 ; E 00) implies
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
 0 for D M   E 0, D < RRA1
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
> 0 for D M   E 0, D < RRA1
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
< 0 for D > RRA1.
Hence, (D;M;AT;RRA1) is increasing in D as long as D  M   E 0 and D < RRA1,
and decreasing above this point. Since (D;M;AT;RRA1) is continous, the maximizer
must be at min(M   E 0; RRA1), which is either a stationary point or a kinck point (if
D = RRA1). Finally, M  E 00 implies
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
 0 for D M   E 00, D < RRA1
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
< 0 for D > M   E 00, D > RRA1
@(D;M;AT;RRA1)
@D
> 0 for D < M   E 00, D > RRA1.
Thus (D;M;AT;RRA1) is increasing in D until D is larger than both M   E 00 and
RRA1, and then decreasing. Thus D = max(M   E 00 ; RRA1) by continuity. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 By denition Et =Mt  Dt. If Et = E 00, Dt =Mt  E 00. We
rst show that Dt < RRAt is not possible in a steady state and hence that E
0
cannot be
a steady state. Assume on the contrary that Dt < RRAt. Since Dt > 0 in steady state,
Dt must satisfy the rst order condition (22). From (26), Dt = 0 until Mt > E
0
. Let
t = t be the rst t such that E 0 =Mt  Dt and Dt > 0. Then
E 0 Mt 1  (1 + r)t 1E0
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(since the return is at least r in each period and the rm did not pay dividends before
t).
Since, by assumption, rE 0  Dt < RRAt for all t in equilibrium, we must have for
t  t
rE 0 < RRAt+1  rE0 + (1 + r)(RRAt   rE 0)+,
which implies
RRAt > rE
0 +
r
1 + r
(E 0   E0):
The same reasoning must hold for RRAt+2 :
Dt+2 < RRAt+2 ) RRAt+1 > rE 0 + r
1 + r
(E 0   E0):
Thus
RRAt > rE
0 +
r
1 + r
(E 0   E0) + r
(1 + r)2
(E 0   E0).
By induction
RRAt > rE
0 +
kX
i=1
r(E 0   E0)
(1 + r)i
for any k.
By letting k !1,
RRAt  (1 + r)E 0   E0.
Since RRAt  ((1 + r)t   1)E0 for any t,
((1 + r)t
   1)E0  RRAt  (1 + r)E 0   E0
 (1 + r)tE0   E0 = ((1 + r)t   1)E0:
We conclude that RRAt  (1 + r)E 0   E0. But since
RRAt+1  rE0 + (1 + r)(RRAt   rE 0)+ = RRAt,
we conclude that RRAt+1 = (1+r)E 0 E0, and by induction for all RRAt in equilibrium
(t  t). But then Dt  rM 0for all t > t, which contradicts that p > 0.
We conclude that the only possible steady state is Et = E
00
, withDt =Mt E 00  rE 00.
From (3), Dt  RRAt ) RRAt+1 = rE0. By induction, RRAt+k = rE0 for all k  0.
Thus, RRAt = rE0 is an absorbing state. Q.E.D.
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